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This chapter explores whether chemical castration can be justified 
as a form of criminal punishment. The author argues that 
castration via the drug medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), or 
some similar drug, does not achieve the punishment aims of 
retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation, but might serve as 
punishment in the form of rehabilitative treatment. However, 
current U.S. chemical castration statutes are too broad to be 
justified as rehabilitative. The state is warranted in targeting 
psychological states in criminal defendants for rehabilitative 
treatment where such states (a) act as a primary cause of a 
criminal offender’s crime and (b) give rise to extraordinary 
worries that the offender will recidivate. Current statutes qualify 
criminal offenders for castration who do not have overwhelming 
sexual urges or other psychological states causally related to their 
crime that may be treated with MPA. Thus, even assuming the 
efficacy of MPA, such statutes are unjustifiable because they 
apply chemical castration to offenders for whom castration will 
have no rehabilitative effect. 
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I begin my analysis of chemical castration as punishment with a 
case where a criminal defendant in Florida was sentenced to 
chemical castration. The case of Phu Tran illustrates the way in 
which current chemical castration statutes may be applied by the 
courts. Florida passed its statute in 1997. It authorizes trial judges 
to sentence any defendant who is convicted of sexual battery to 
receive medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). If the defendant is 
convicted of sexual battery and has a prior conviction for sexual 
battery, the statute requires the trial court to impose a sentence of 
MPA administration (Spalding, 1998, p. 120). The trial judge 
issuing a sentence of MPA must have a medical consult who 
determines that the “defendant is an appropriate candidate for 
treatment” (p. 123). However, the statute does not define “medical 
expert” or “appropriate candidate.” Informed consent for the 
treatment is not mandated. 
Healing People 
C13.S1 
C13.P2 
C13.P3 
U.S. Chemical Castration Statutes and the Case 
of Phu Tran 
In 2005, Phu Tran was convicted of sexual battery for digital 
penetration of two women while they were customers at a nail 
salon in (Tran v. State, 2007). Tran was sentenced to two 
consecutive terms of incarceration: 8 years in prison for one 
offense to be followed by 12 years of incarceration for the other 
offense. At the time of his sentence, the court noted that the 1997 
Florida chemical castration statute made a chemical castration 
order mandatory, but reserved ruling pending an evaluation from 
an expert regarding whether Tran was a good candidate for 
castration. Four months later, Tran was sentenced to five years of 
MPA, the drug most commonly used to chemically castrate, in 
addition to his prison sentences. 
At the court-ordered hearing to determine Tran’s 
candidacy for castration, the state’s psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas, 
testified that she thought Tran might be a sociopath. Dr. Thomas 
noted that while she was not prepared to say Tran was a “dyed-in-
the-wool psychopath,” Tran “certainly has some of the 
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characteristics” (Francheschina, 2005). Dr. Thomas also told the 
judge that the drugs used in chemical castration were effective in 
curbing sexual appetite by “shutting down the production of 
testosterone,” and that persons subject to chemical castration “are 
eunuchs for all intents and purposes.” In the end, she concluded 
Tran was indeed a good candidate for the castrating drugs and 
recommended he be placed on them permanently (although, as 
already stated, the court gave Tran the much more limited 
sentence of five years of castration). 
In response to Tran’s sentencing appeal, the appellate court 
said the trial court had made a mistake when it reserved ruling on 
the duration of Tran’s MPA treatment until four months after the 
sentencing hearing (Francheschina, 2005). Importantly, the court 
noted that chemical castration is not to be viewed as pure 
treatment but instead as a part of a punishment package. This 
means whether it is to be applied, and its duration, must be 
determined at sentencing so that the court can ensure that an 
offender’s punishment package as a whole is proportional to his 
crime (Tran v. State, 2007). The court held that application of 
additional punishment after a Tran’s sentencing hearing violated 
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his constitutional right not to be subject to multiple prosecutions 
and punishments for the same criminal offense; that is, the trial 
court had violated the double jeopardy rule. Here is a portion of 
the court’s ruling: 
The state contends that the MPA statute is for 
treatment purposes and does not constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Second, 
the state argues that even if the statute is for 
punishment purposes, as long as MPA treatment is 
ordered at sentencing, the final determination as to 
the appropriateness of such treatment could be 
made thereafter without creating a double jeopardy 
violation. . . . We reject the state’s contention that 
the MPA statute is for remedial treatment purposes, 
as opposed to punishment. The language of the 
entire statute speaks of MPA in terms of a sentence 
and a penalty. In the context of civil commitment 
proceedings for sexually violent predators, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that “[t]he 
categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or 
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criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory 
construction.” (Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
361 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 
368 (1986)). As a matter of statutory construction, 
it would appear that a sentence to administration of 
MPA does constitute punishment. Pursuant to the 
statutory scheme, the administration of MPA is 
imposed as part of a criminal sentence. Indeed, 
section 794.0235 is placed within Florida’s 
criminal code, rather than under Florida’s public 
health code. Compare §§ 394.910-.931, Fla. Stat. 
(2006) (Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually 
Violent Predators). Since the legislature has 
deemed MPA treatment a penalty, we conclude that 
it is part of the defendant’s punishment and 
sentence. (Tran v. State, 2007) 
In sum, the appellate court held that once Tran began serving his 
sentence, the trial court's subsequent order of MPA injections for a 
period of five years violated Tran’s constitutional rights because it 
amounted to additional punishment (Tran v. State, 2007). And 
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because under the statute MPA treatment is a state-imposed 
punishment, it must be justified as such (i.e., it must serve a 
purpose of punishment—retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, or 
rehabilitation).10 
The Florida chemical castration statute (§794.0235) under 
which Tran was sentenced has several interesting characteristics. 
Under the statute, a first-time offender convicted of sexual battery 
                                                          
10 Model Penal Code section §1.02(2) states that the general 
purposes of sentencing is “to render sentences in all cases within a 
range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the 
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of 
offenders; and when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender 
rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of dangerous 
offenders, restoration of crime victims and communities, and 
reintegration of offenders into the law-abiding community, 
provided these goals are pursued within the boundaries of 
proportionality in subsection (a)(i); and (iii) to render sentences no 
more severe than necessary to achieve the applicable purposes in 
subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii)…” 
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may be sentenced to castration regardless of the age of the 
offender’s victim. This means that the statute does not target sex 
offenders who prey upon children, but all sex offenders. As the 
court in Phu Tran’s case noted, chemical castration is mandatory 
on second offense. The statute also states that the court may 
sentence an offender to chemical castration, or the offender may 
voluntarily opt for surgical castration instead. When an offender is 
sentenced to MPA, this sentence of mandatory if a court-
appointed medical expert determines he is a good candidate for 
MPA treatment (although what makes an offender a good 
candidate is not specified). Treatment is to begin not more than 
one week after a defendant who is incarcerated is released. 
Informed consent for treatment is not required, meaning that the 
offender subject to an MPA order need not be told of the many 
side effects of the drug (discussed in detail later in the chapter) If 
an offender refuses fails to show up for treatment or refuses 
treatment, he may be found guilty of a second-degree felony and 
sentenced to life in prison. Finally, a court order must specify a 
duration for castration, whether it is a specific term or for life (as 
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would necessarily be the case if the offender opted for surgical 
castration). 
A few other U.S. states have similar statutes (for an 
overview of U.S. castration statutes, see Scott & Holmberg, 2003). 
The California chemical castration statute differs from Florida’s 
because it is aimed at sex offenders who victimize children: any 
person convicted of a specified sex offense—including sodomy, 
oral copulation, and sexual penetration—where the victim is under 
13 may be punished with castration (Scott & Holmberg, 2003). 
Similar to Florida, California’s statute stipulates that castration 
may be chemical or voluntary surgical, is at judicial discretion on 
first offense and mandatory on second offense, and is a condition 
of parole. However, no medical or psychiatric evaluation is 
required, and MPA is to be administered until the California 
Department of Corrections demonstrates to prison board treatment 
is no longer necessary (Scott & Holmberg, 2003). 
In Louisiana, any person convicted of aggravated rape, 
forcible rape, second degree sexual battery, aggravated incest, or 
molestation of a juvenile when the victim is under the age of 13, 
or any repeat sex offender, may be sentenced to chemical 
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castration (Scott & Holmberg, 2003). Castration is mandatory if a 
qualified mental health professional specifies it is necessary in a 
treatment plan (Scott & Holmberg, 2003). A particularly 
interesting aspect of the Louisiana statute is its stipulation that the 
offender must pay the ongoing costs for evaluation, treatment 
plan, and treatment (including MPA injections). (It is unclear what 
happens if the offender cannot pay for his injections—I assume he 
would still be subject to the drug.) In addition, in Louisiana 
castration is not a condition for release; it is a punishment to be 
applied in addition to incarceration (Scott & Holmberg, 2003). 
Chemical castration works via antiandrogen drugs, often 
by way of large weekly injections. Depro-Provera® is the brand 
name for MPA, the drug most often used for chemical castration 
in the United States. MPA is an analogue of the female hormone 
progesterone, used to reduce the normal level of testosterone in a 
male by 50%—a level equal to the level found in prepubescent 
boys (Smith, 1998). MPA inhibits, through its effect upon neural 
pathways in the sexual system of the brain, the release of 
luteinizing hormone from the pituitary gland (Mellella et al., 
1989). Luteinizing hormone is the chemical messenger that 
Healing People 
C13.P11 
normally stimulates the testicles to produce androgen. Hence, the 
ultimate effect of MPA is to reduce the level of androgen, 
especially testosterone, in the blood stream (Mellella et al., 1989). 
The drug is thought to reduce sex-drive and levels of aggression in 
men and to reduce the capacity for an erection (Smith, 1998), 
although the exact impacts of the drug differ from person to 
person (Stinneford, 2005). MPA has significant side effects, such 
as osteoporosis, changes in cardiovascular health, blood fat levels, 
blood pressure and symptoms that mimic women's menopause 
(Stinneford, 2005). Although chemical castration can be applied 
as a temporary punishment, and the injections may be halted and 
offender’s sexual function restored, some of these side effects 
have been found to linger long after injections are stopped. 
There is some evidence that judges are not sentencing 
eligible offenders to chemical castration in the few U.S. states that 
allow it, even in cases where castration is made mandatory by 
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statute.24 However, how the statutes are currently applied is less 
important than how they could be applied in any particular case. 
Where a certain punishment is legal, the possibility remains that it 
may be applied to eligible offenders, and if a law is written such 
that it is likely to generate unjustifiable applications of criminal 
punishment, the law should be rewritten or repealed. Further, the 
lack of use means that in the rare cases where an offender is 
sentenced to chemical castration, his sentence is arbitrary. In his 
concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia (1972), which found the 
death penalty to be unconstitutional because it application to a tiny 
subset of homicide defendants was necessarily arbitrary, Justice 
Stewart wrote:  
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the 
same way that being struck by lightning is cruel 
and unusual. . . . I simply conclude that [the 
constitution] cannot tolerate the infliction of a 
                                                          
24 One law review article notes that from the time the Florida 
statute was enacted in 1997 to 2005, judges had ordered chemical 
castration in three of 107 eligible cases (see Simpson, 2007). 
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sentence of death under legal systems that permit 
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so 
freakishly imposed. (Furman v. Georgia, 1972) 
My analysis here takes the three previously discussed 
statutes at face value. I will examine whether the aims of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—the four 
most prominent aims of punishment in the U.S. criminal justice 
system—can be achieved by chemical castration. I conclude that 
the only possible aim to be met by chemical castration is 
rehabilitation; however, as the statutes are written, this aim is not 
achieved. Thus, all three statutes represent an unjustifiable use of 
state power. 
The Functions of Punishment 
Criminal sanctions, including incarceration, are designed to serve 
particular functions. These are often called the principles of 
punishment, and the four primary functions are retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.26 According to the 
                                                          
26 Although both restoration of the victim, and reintegration of the 
offender into the community are mentioned in the Model Penal 
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principle of retribution, violators of the law should get their “just 
deserts” such that public censure or punishment is an appropriate 
response to a wrongful act. The principle of deterrence attempts to 
influence an offender and other’s decision-making with the threat 
of punishment. Both the general population and the specific 
offender who is punished may be deterred from choosing to 
commit criminal acts by punishment. The principle of 
incapacitation also aims to stop defendants from offending, but 
there is no attempt to influence decision-making; instead, the 
offender’s environment is manipulated to make reoffending 
impossible, typically via incarceration. Finally, rehabilitation is 
the idea that offenders can be reformed so that they won’t 
reoffend. 
Most legal scholars agree that punishment aims to fulfill 
these multiple functions, although adherents of different ethical 
theories emphasize the importance of different functions. As 
                                                                                                                                 
Code purposes section, I discuss neither here, in part because 
neither seem sufficiently influential in the generation of verdicts 
or policy in the United States. 
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Brown (2002) notes, one of the central problems in the criminal 
law is that it cannot be justified by a single ethical theory. 
Deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are easily 
understood as supporting the utilitarian aim of social order 
because they focus on the harmful consequences of crime. 
Deontological moralism, on the other hand, tends to stress the aim 
of retribution, where punishment is based upon blame and must be 
proportional to wrongfulness of the crime: criminal offenders 
deserve moral condemnation and punishment proportional to the 
harm caused by and/or the moral wrongfulness of their action. 
I used to see the functions of punishment as a checklist 
where the aims were ordered by relative importance: (a) 
retribution, (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, and (d) 
rehabilitation. But I have come to see this as an extreme 
oversimplification.28 Western systems of criminal justice seem to 
                                                          
28 I have also come to see deterrence as a less important aim, due 
to the overwhelming research that offenders tend not to be 
deterred by threat of punishment (Mendes, 2004; Tonry, 2008) 
and rehabilitation as more important. Rehabilitation is an 
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embrace all four of the functions listed, but the relationship 
between the aims is more complex than an ordered list. Although I 
cannot give a detailed account of interactions of the functions of 
punishment and justifying ethical theories here, I now feel that 
retribution should act as a general constraint on the total amount 
of punishment that can be applied in any case, and the other 
principles, especially incapacitation and rehabilitation, should 
primarily inform the type of punishment that is applied within the 
range of appropriate punishment proportional to the offender and 
his wrongdoing. That is, the total amount of punishment must be 
proportionate to the crime and to the type of offender (e.g. 
homicide vs. theft, adult vs. youth offender, offender with full 
mental capacity vs. diminished capacity); however, questions 
regarding whether the offender needs to be incapacitated via 
incarceration, or whether certain types of punishment are likely to 
deter other offenders similar to this offender in the future or 
whether certain punishments will rehabilitate (or will reduce the 
                                                                                                                                 
especially worthwhile principle of punishment from the virtue 
theory perspective (Sifferd, 2016). 
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possibility of rehabilitation) should also be considered within the 
overall parameters of proportionality. 
Norval Morris (1974) famously advocates this kind of 
account, often called limiting retributivism, and some argue that it 
is the consensus model of criminal punishment in the United 
States and Europe.30 Limiting retributivism is a hybrid theory of 
punishment, where retributive notions of just deserts provide an 
appropriate range of justified penalty within which an offender 
might be sentenced. Backward-looking retributive considerations 
of proportionality must then be balanced with forward-looking 
considerations of social order to create a punishment package that 
first and foremost is proportional to crime and offender, but that 
also aims to reduce recidivism and overall crime rates. 
Morris’s (1974) limiting retributivism specifically places 
strict upper limits on punishment based on desert, but no lower 
limit (Frase, 2003). Morris also promotes the principle of 
                                                          
30 The recently redrafted language of the Model Penal Code’s 
“purposes” section appears to reflect limiting retributivism (Frase, 
2003). 
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parsimony in punishment, which requires that “the least restrictive 
sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be 
imposed” (Morris, 1974, p. 59). Courts ought not to impose the 
maximum an offender deserves unless there are very good reasons 
to do so and, indeed, should aim to assign lesser sentences and 
community-based sanctions whenever appropriate (Frase, 2003). 
Reasons to impose a sentence toward the more severe end of the 
retributive range include forward-looking considerations such as 
the need to incapacitate an offender considered especially 
dangerous. 
A limiting retributive account of the aims of punishment 
diminishes the importance of deterrence in comparison to a pure 
utilitarian justification of punishment, because retributive 
considerations set the upper limit of punishment. However, 
limiting retributivism does not depend solely on notions of just 
deserts. Limiting retributivism is a “mixed” account of 
punishment that applies principles from both utilitarianism and 
legal moralism. Many important legal scholars have adopted some 
version of a hybrid theory, including H. L. A. Hart (1968), who 
also viewed desert as providing an upper limit on criminal 
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sanctions (p. 237). Hart indicated that one must appeal to a 
retributive account of appropriateness of punishment given the 
crime committed, which “set[s] a maximum within which 
penalties, judged most likely to prevent the repetition of the crime 
by the offender or others, are to be chosen” (pp. 236–237). 
There are worries regarding how any retributive theory, 
including limiting retributivism, can distinguish wrongful 
behavior deserving punishment from behavior which the state 
oughtn’t punish (e.g., adultery) and how such a theory can clearly 
articulate degrees of wrongfulness (Kaplow & Shavell  2002, pp. 
303–305). However, I agree with Frase (2003) that the criminal 
law, especially U.S. state law, already does a pretty good job 
providing a proportional structure of offenses. There is general 
agreement that state criminal codes address behavior that ought to 
be considered criminal and deserving of criminal punishment and 
do so utilizing a sliding scale matching wrongfulness to degree of 
punishment. This is the case despite clear instances of 
overcriminalization of some behavior (as many would argue was 
the case with the United States’ so-called war on drugs) and the 
fact that the U.S. criminal justice system as a whole may have 
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failed meet Morris’s (1974) principle of parsimony. (That is, while 
the scale matching wrongfulness of crime to severity of 
punishment may be in one sense somewhat accurate, the whole 
continuum of punishments is too severe.) 
With regard to articulating degrees of wrongfulness, the 
Illinois Criminal Sexual Assault Act (720 ILCS 5/12-12, et seq.) 
provides a good example. Illinois’s statute stipulates a wide range 
of possible sentences for conviction of a sex offense (defined as 
sexual penetration with force or threat of force) from four years to 
natural life, depending on the presence of aggravating 
circumstances. Such circumstances include whether this is a 
defendant’s first offense, whether the victim suffered bodily harm, 
whether the offender used a deadly weapon, and the age of the 
victim (both a minor and an elderly victim enhances the sentence). 
Thus, a first conviction of simple sexual assault might result in 
anything from a 4-year to a 16-year prison sentence, and 
aggravating factors may further increase the range of sentence: 
sexual assault resulting in bodily harm or of a young victim carries 
a sentence of 6 to 30 years on a first conviction and natural life if 
the offender is being sentenced for a second sexual assault. 
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However, as previously indicated, Morris’s (1974) limiting 
retributivism does not generally provide minimum sentences. The 
Illinois statute stipulates a four-year minimum. In addition, Morris 
encouraged judges to cluster sentences around the lower end of 
the range indicated by considerations of desert, which I can say 
from experience the Illinois Cook County Criminal Courts often 
do not do. Even so, the Illinois statute, like many state statutes can 
be taken as an example of limiting retributivism in action. All of 
the aggravating factors listed in the statute represent aspects of the 
crime that speak to a retributive assessment of desert and 
incrementally increase punishment based on these factors. 
Although the Illinois statute provides an example of 
retributive notions of just desert acting to delimit the appropriate 
range of punishments, it does not invite serious consideration of 
forward-looking aims of punishment except those automatically 
achieved by incarceration (e.g., incapacitation and possibly 
deterrence). There are no specifically rehabilitative options 
available to the court sentencing a sex offender in Illinois, as there 
are for offenders sentenced for a drug conviction, where an Illinois 
drug court may order mandatory addiction treatment (see 720 
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ILCS 5/12-12, et seq.). I will argue that chemical castration cannot 
be justified as appropriate retributive punishment or as achieving 
the aims of deterrence or incapacitation, but might be justified as 
part of an punishment package by the forward-looking aim of 
rehabilitative treatment for a small subset of sex offenders, in the 
same way that coercive medical treatment for drug-addicted 
offenders is a justifiable punishment. 
Retribution 
As previously discussed, limiting retributivism aims to use 
considerations of just desert and proportionality to set the upper 
limits of a criminal sentence. Such a sentence often consists in a 
stint in prison, but Morris also supported community-based 
sanctions and treatment programs (Morris & Tonry, 1991). 
Indeed, Morris and Tonry wrote an entire book in support of what 
they called “intermediate punishments” that lie between prison 
and probation in response to the explosion of the U.S. prison 
population, advocating sentences of intensive probation, 
substantial fines, community service orders, residential controls, 
and treatment orders (Morris & Tonry, 1991, p. 4). They argued 
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that such sentences are a more proportional response to many 
felonies, less expensive than traditional incarceration, and more 
likely to accomplish treatment objectives than prison-based 
treatment (Morris & Tonry, 1991). Thus, the hybrid theory of 
limiting retributivism is certainly compatible with sentences other 
than prison. 
Even so, I do not think the particular sentence of chemical 
castration cannot be directly justified as a state-sanctioned 
punishment on retributive grounds. As University of Chicago law 
professor Dan Kahan (1996) has noted, although we seem 
comfortable with the notion that the purpose of sending offenders 
to prison is at least in part to cause suffering, European countries 
and the United States openly reject states using alternative means 
of causing suffering, especially corporal punishment. In 1978, the 
European Court of Human Rights found corporal punishment 
violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
because it was fundamentally degrading (Tyrer v. United 
Kingdom, 1978). In the United States, the last instance of state-
imposed corporal punishment occurred in Delaware in 1952 (a 
flogging). Since this time the legal community appears to be 
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operating as though corporal punishment violates the 
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
(although the Supreme Court has not decided the question). If 
chemical castration is cast as a purely retributive punishment, it 
seems to be the type of inhumane corporal punishment no longer 
practiced. 
Further, retributive punishments must be proportional to 
the type of agent and degree of harm caused, and chemical 
castration would seem to be proportional in the lex talionis sense. 
Lex talionis punishments are retaliatory eye-for-an-eye 
punishments similar in kind to the crime committed. One can see 
lex talionis–type retributive sentiment in this statement on 
chemical castration found in a New York University Law School 
forum blog (in the blog’s corpus, not in the comments): “I fail to 
see the problem with irreversibly invading and mutilating a child-
rapist, much less causing him to suffer the side effects of 
menopause. In fact, there seems no more fitting a punishment for 
the child rapist (NYU Forum on Law, Culture, and Society, 2012). 
Chemical castration, at least when viewed as a retributive 
punishment, would seem to harken back to the days when Thomas 
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Jefferson (1778) wrote a bill that included sentences of up to 15 
lashes for witchcraft; death by poison for those who killed by 
poisoning; castration for men guilty of rape, polygamy, or 
sodomy; and a minimum half-inch hole bored in the nose cartilage 
of women convicted of sex crimes. Morris and Tonry (1991) 
refuse to even discuss the idea of retaliatory corporal punishments 
in their book on limiting retributivism:  
We shall not discuss corporal punishments, the 
lash, the birch, the chopping of hands and tongues, 
the slitting of lips and noses, the slicing of ears. 
They are less romantic than brutalizing, not only to 
those who suffer such punishments but—and the 
historical record is clear on this—to the society that 
applies them. (pp. 5–6) 
In sum, cast as a retaliatory corporal punishment, chemical 
castration would seem to be degrading, brutalizing, or cruel such 
that it may violate the U.S. Constitution Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Certainly, the 
punishment is unusual in that it only seven states have chemical 
castration statutes (Stinneford, 2005, p. 559). Scholars also argue 
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that the practice is cruel because its aim to “exert control over the 
mind of the offender by rendering it incapable of experiencing 
sexual desire” which violates offenders’ dignity and has painful, 
disabling, and possibly fatal long-term effects (Stinneford, 2005, 
p. 559), thus the practice may be seen as violating contemporary 
standards of decency. 
In addition to these concerns, there are other, more 
pragmatic worries about chemical castration as retributive 
punishment. As famous jurist William Blackstone (1879) argued: 
Retaliation may sometimes be too easy a sentence; 
as if a man maliciously should put out the 
remaining eye of him who had lost one before, it is 
too slight a punishment for the maimer to lose only 
one of his. . . . Besides there are many crimes, that 
will in no shape admit of these penalties, without 
manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft cannot be 
punished by theft, defamation by defamation, 
forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery, and the 
like. (p. 13) 
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One can imagine cases where castration of a sex offender might be 
both too easy and too tough a retributive sentence. Imagine a 
pedophile who is disgusted with himself for committing sex 
crimes against children to the point where he is suicidal. 
Treatment that diminishes his sexual desire for children may be a 
relief for this offender, not painful retaliation for his crimes. On 
the other hand, an undergraduate man who date-raped another 
undergraduate might legitimately argue that a sentence of 
chemical castration for even an intermediate length of time—let’s 
say, 10 or 15 years—would be too severe a sentence, especially 
given that it is likely to impact his ability to obtain a partner and 
have children during the normal span of time within which most 
persons start a family. 
Blackstone’s worries about state “wickedness” are also 
important. State-endorsed physical harm of citizens can 
undermine the state’s authority to impose legal duties and thus 
rule of law. A state that performs violent acts against its citizens, 
even in response to violence, may lose the moral high ground in 
the eyes of the citizenry necessary to request that citizens do not 
respond similarly to violence committed against them. From the 
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perspective of the theory of law proposed by Hart (1961), state-
imposed violent corporal punishment may degrade the social 
acceptance he claimed was vital to citizens’ felt obligation to 
follow the law. 
It seems clear that chemical castration does not achieve 
aim of retribution in a way acceptable to a modern liberal 
democracy. Retaliatory physical harm by way of direct brain 
manipulations ought not be considered an appropriate response to 
sex crimes, because such a punishment (a) is degrading, 
inhumane, and may be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual; (b) 
may constitute both too lenient and too severe a punishment, 
depending on the case; and (c) may undermine the state’s moral 
authority and thus rule of law. 
Therefore it seems chemical castration as a state-
sanctioned criminal punishment must accomplish a forward-
looking aim of punishment to be justifiable. Next I will consider 
whether castration achieves the aims of deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation. 
Deterrence 
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There are two ways in which a potential offender may be deterred 
by punishment. First, criminal punishments may reduce the 
overall rate of crime in the general population. This is termed 
general deterrence. Second, an offender who has experienced 
criminal punishment may be deterred from committing future 
crimes because of this experience. This is called specific 
deterrence. In both cases persons considering committing a crime 
are dissuaded from doing so to avoid the unpleasantness of 
punishment. 
Deterrence anchors many utilitarian accounts of 
punishment. Bentham (1996) argued that more severe 
punishments were necessary to convince potential offenders not to 
commit more serious crimes (which, in many cases, have a bigger 
payoff for offenders), while lesser punishments were enough to 
convince citizens not to commit lesser crimes. Thus a fine might 
be enough to stop people from speeding or parking in a 
handicapped spot, but a hefty penalty such as a long prison 
sentence might be needed to convince a potential offender not to 
kill someone they really wanted dead. In this way some utilitarians 
argue the appropriate criminal punishment for a crime is (at least 
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in part) determined by the rational calculus of costs and benefits of 
the crime to the potential offender. 
However, this sort of utilitarian way of determining 
criminal penalties has been undermined by research on deterrence. 
Although it seems that in general the existence of a criminal 
justice system may deter some persons from crime, and thus 
societies with state-enforced criminal penalties may have lower 
crime rates than they would have without criminal penalties, 30 
years of studies on deterrence have made clear that even very 
broad changes in punishment regimes have almost no effect on 
rates of offending (Tonry, 2008). That is, even very severe 
increases in punishments, such as three-strikes laws that applied 
life in prison sentences to an offender’s third felony conviction, or 
the death penalty to aggravated homicides, have little or no effect 
on crime rates (Tonry, 2008). Even though persons who commit 
crimes must in some sense know that their acts may be subject to 
criminal punishment, the type or severity of punishment that may 
be applied seems to have little effect on their decision-making 
(Tonry, 2008). 
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offenders within the few states with chemical castration statutes 
will be deterred from sex crimes by the specific threat of 
castration. First, many potential sex offenders in these states won’t 
know that their act may be subject to a chemical castration statute. 
In this case the threat of castration can have no deterrent effect in 
addition to a general desire to avoid criminal punishment. Second, 
even if a potential sex offender knew he was committing a crime 
within a state with a chemical castration statute, he may not think 
his act in particular would be likely to result in castration: in the 
previously discussed case, even the judge seemed surprised that 
castration was a mandatory penalty for Tran because the two 
incidents amounted to repeat sex crimes. And, as we have already 
noted, many judges within the states that have chemical castration 
as a possible penalty fail to apply the penalty when offenders 
qualify. In general, sex offenders may experience less fear of 
criminal punishment than other types of offenders because of the 
large percentage of sex crimes that are not reported—the majority, 
according to the National Institute of Justice (2010b). An even 
smaller subset of sex crimes reported actually result in a criminal 
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conviction. For all of these reasons, the particular punishment of 
chemical castration cannot be considered a general deterrent for 
persons who may commit qualifying sex crimes and thus cannot 
justify the previously discussed castration statutes.57 
There is a somewhat stronger likelihood that chemical 
castration could act as a specific deterrent. We might imagine a 
case where an offender who was chemically castrated decides not 
to commit another sex crime for fear of another round of MPA 
                                                          
57 It is unclear whether proposed penalties would have a robust 
deterrent effect in an ideal criminal justice system, where the 
application of criminal penalties was swift and 100% accurate. 
Even in this case, there would be epistemic and other agential 
limitations on deterrent effect. Given this, it is so unlikely our 
criminal justice system will approach ideal deterrent effect that we 
need not discuss the possibility further. (Note the difference, too, 
between the likelihood that a judge will unjustly apply a chemical 
castration statute as written in a particular case and the likelihood 
that our criminal justice system and possible offenders will 
function so as to have a better deterrent effect.) 
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treatment. But this scenario assumes an offender who, like Phu 
Tran in Florida, is given a sentence of MPA for a limited duration. 
In California, however, MPA is to be administered as a condition 
of parole until the California Department of Corrections 
demonstrates to prison board treatment is no longer necessary. If 
the California Department of Corrections made a point of 
demonstrating to the prison board that MPA is no longer 
necessary, we might assume the offender in question is reformed 
such that a specific deterrent effect is unnecessary. 
In Florida and Louisiana, it is possible a castrated offender 
might be taken off MPA and then deterred by the possibility of 
being recastrated. However, in both states MPA sentences can be 
quite long, even lifelong. And in the case of a shorter sentence, 
say, where the offender is given the drug until he is in his 50s, it 
may be that by this point in his life he is less likely to suffer from 
very strong sexual urges due to old age and thus would have less 
need for a deterrent. (Indeed, many offenders may “age out” of 
criminal tendencies.) Finally, it is obvious that if an offender opts 
for voluntary surgical castration under the Florida or California 
statutes, there can be no specific deterrent effect. But, in small 
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number of cases in Florida and Louisiana, it is possible, if 
extremely unlikely, chemical castration could serve as a specific 
deterrent. 
There is a deeper problem than worries about duration with 
the notion of castration as specific deterrent, however. To be 
deterred by the threat of chemical castration an offender must 
experience chemical castration as unpleasant, so he will choose 
not to commit another sex crime so as to avoid being recastrated. 
But this may not be the case. Some sex offenders choose to be 
surgically castrated because they wish to be rid of their deviant 
sexual urges forever, and other sex offenders feel that 
administration of MPA helps them become a fully responsible 
agent, because, as Cephalus in the Pato’s Republic might say, it 
rids them of a “mad master” (Book I). If chemical castration acts 
as some psychiatrists and psychologists say it should, and it 
reduces overwhelming sexual urges so as to allow offenders to 
make more responsible sexual choices, it may be experienced as a 
positive treatment for an unwanted affliction. In this case, the drug 
would certainly have no specific deterrent effect, although it may 
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have a therapeutic and possibly incapacitative effect (see the 
following discussion). 
Because chemical castration is extremely unlikely to have 
a general deterrent effect and because chemical castration may 
have a specific deterrent effect only a very small number of 
offenders who qualify for castration under the statutes, it seems 
that the Florida, California, and Louisiana chemical castration 
statutes cannot be justified by appeal to castration’s deterrent 
effect. 
Incapacitation 
The aim of deterrence focuses on the way punishment might 
convince a person not to commit crimes. Punishment that 
incapacitates, on the other hand, forces an offender not to 
reoffend. If chemical castration incapacitates sex offenders from 
committing sex crimes, without the cost of keeping them in 
prison, then it seems this might be a good forward-looking 
justification for the punishment. 
However, as previously discussed, under limiting 
retributivism (the justification of punishment manifest in the U.S. 
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Model Penal Code), use of MPA as incapacitation of criminal 
offenders ought to be limited by retributive considerations of 
proportionality of crime and type of offender to sentence. For 
example, we ought not to incapacitate offenders in prison 
indefinitely if the proportional upper limit of punishment for their 
crime is a 15-year sentence, regardless of how dangerous we think 
they are. Partly, of course, this is because any assessment of 
dangerousness is only a best guess regarding an offender’s 
likelihood of recidivism. The length of a castration sentence ought 
to be limited to the amount of punishment allowed by notions of 
just desert. The appellate court in Pho Tran’s case recognized this 
limitation when it demanded the length of the administration of 
MPA be determined at sentencing: administration of MPA must 
be viewed as one component of a sex offender’s punishment 
package, where the total amount of a sex offender’s punishment 
must be made to fit within the proportional limiting range of 
appropriate punishments. 
This means that the California statute, which indicates that 
MPA should be used as a condition of parole for as long as the 
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Department of Corrections deems necessary,59 probably consists 
in an unjustified use of MPA as incapacitation. In the absence of 
an effort on the part of the Department of Corrections to show the 
offender no longer needs the MPA, the default will be to continue 
MPA injections for the rest of his life. Thus, the length of time the 
offender is subject to administration of MPA is dependent not on a 
proportional period of time given the offender’s offense and level 
of responsibility, but instead, on the Department of Corrections’ 
determination that the treatment is “necessary” (where the reasons 
it might be necessary are not specified in the statute). In addition, 
the Florida and California statutes, which indicate that an offender 
may have voluntary surgical castration in lieu of administration of 
MPA, may also generate sentences meant to be incapacitative that 
                                                          
59 California Penal Code 645(d) reads in full: “(d) The parolee 
shall begin medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment one week prior 
to his or her release from confinement in the state prison or other 
institution and shall continue treatments until the Department of 
Corrections demonstrates to the Board of Prison Terms that this 
treatment is no longer necessary.” 
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violate proportionality. Surgical castration is obviously a lifelong 
punishment. In many cases this permanent sanction will exceed 
the upper limit of proportional punishment for a particular 
offender, regardless of whether this was his “choice.” 
However, there is another, more important concern 
regarding chemical castration as incapacitative punishment: 
namely, that MPA may not actually incapacitate sex offenders 
from sex crimes. Prison incapacitates by removing an offender 
from society, thus making it impossible to commit most crimes. 
Castration does not, however, remove an offender from situations 
where he may commit a sex crime; instead, it attempts to address 
the cause of sex crimes (sexual urges, assuming that this is indeed 
the cause; see the following discussion) regardless of where he is 
located (and often, castration is a condition of release into the 
community). Some proponents of chemical castration (i.e., 
politicians) seem to think that MPA removes an offender’s ability 
to have an erection—although it is not clear MPA does this—and 
thus his ability to commit a sex offense is removed. But, of course, 
this is not the case, as Phu Tran’s sexual assault shows (Phu Trans 
digitally penetrated his victims). 
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offenders clearly show that MPA should not be considered 
incapacitative despite evidence that it reduces sexual desire (see 
Chapter 12 of this volume). Anecdotally, psychiatrist Chris Ryan 
tells me that some sex offenders experience better sexual function 
on MPA. But even if chemical castration severely limits sexual 
desire—and reduces sexual capacity to some extent—a sex 
offender’s sexual desires and capacity may not be causally related 
to his past sex offense or to the likelihood he will commit another 
sex offense in the future. Remember the Pho Tran case. It seems 
likely that Tran was motivated to sexually assault the two clients 
of the nail salon where he worked because of the sexual desire he 
felt for the two women. In this case MPA may work to reduce the 
overwhelming sexual urges Tran feels toward women once he is 
released, and it may have an effect on reducing the likelihood of 
recidivism. But there are other stories we might tell about the 
motivations of Tran. It is at least possible that instead of 
experiencing overwhelming desire for sex with the women, Tran 
has a deep-seeded hatred of women. (Maybe he was sexually 
abused by a woman as a child, or maybe he was ridiculed one too 
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many times by women in school.) On this story of Tran’s crime, 
when Tran sexually assaulted the women, he felt no sexual desire 
at all, but instead felt hatred and anger and thus wanted to make 
the women feel powerless and under his control. Or, imagine Tran 
has a low IQ and some intellectual disabilities and was raised in a 
very sheltered environment where his overbearing mother ignored 
his sexuality. His first job outside of the home was at the nail 
salon, and a vindictive neighbor told him that if he thought a 
woman was pretty, she would like it if he assaulted her. In this 
case, sexual desires are one of the causes of Tran’s assaults, but he 
isn’t suffering from overwhelming sexual desires such that 
administration of MPA seems to be the best means to reduce 
Tran’s likelihood of recidivism. Certainly, in this third set of 
imagined circumstances, it makes more sense to educate Tran than 
to castrate him. And if his hatred for women was the primary 
cause of his crime, Tran is unlikely to be incapacitated by the 
reduction of his sexual urges, although the level of aggression he 
feels toward women might be impacted by the drugs (but not, 
probably, his hatred). 
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reason why studies find chemical castration has little to no effect 
on recidivism—although there is anecdotal evidence that 
voluntary administration of MPA can help some sex offenders and 
others who suffer from sexual disorders—is because sex offenses 
are committed for a plethora of reasons, and overwhelming sexual 
urges are just one category of such causes. Decreasing sexual 
urges, and even decreasing overall levels of aggression, may have 
no impact on some sex offender’s likelihood of committing a sex 
offense because it might not address many of the psychological 
causes of his past antisocial decisions and might thus also fail to 
address his likelihood of recidivism. Anecdotal stories may 
identify a sex offender who is plagued by strong, unwanted desires 
for illegal sexual partners or acts and who can successfully use 
MPA as a means to decrease his attraction to illegal sex partners, 
along with therapy and other tools. But the larger studies 
identified by Ryan (see Chapter 12 of this volume) tend to focus 
on administration of MPA to large categories of offenders, where 
the category is defined by the type of crime an offender 
committed. Within these categories many offenders may not have 
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overwhelming sexual urges, nor the desire to alter their decision-
making or access to multiple sources of treatment. Even if 
administration of MPA impacts sexual capacity, it will not 
incapacitate most of these offenders from sex offenses. 
In sum, there is some evidence that MPA may lessen 
sexual desire and/or levels of aggression, but it isn’t at all clear 
that this creates an incapacity to commit sex crimes. Studies 
indicate that most of the offenders who qualify for chemical 
castration under the Florida, California, and Louisiana chemical 
statutes will not be incapacitated by administration of MPA (or 
surgical castration, for that matter). It could be that a detailed 
medical exam could be used to identify the subset of sex offenders 
who suffer from overwhelming sexual urges and thus who might 
be less likely to recidivate if given MPA. But note, even these 
offenders will not be incapacitated by the drug in the same way 
they would be by incarceration. Instead, it makes more sense to 
consider MPA a rehabilitative tool that could help them decide not 
to recidivate. For these reasons, the previously discussed 
castration statutes cannot be justified on incapacitative grounds. 
Rehabilitation 
Healing People 
C13.P52 
C13.P53 
C13.P54 
While it is tempting to see rehabilitation as 
incompatible with punishment, this view is 
incorrect. Punishment is best understood as a 
response to crime. . . . Rehabilitation is one of 
many possible responses. 
—Thom Brooks (2012) p. 56 
A punishment is rehabilitative if it reforms an offender such that 
he chooses not to commit further crimes. Rehabilitative programs 
attempt to influence offenders’ rational processes such that they 
are more easily able to follow legal norms, either by giving them 
skills that will improve situational factors and decrease their 
likelihood of recidivism, or, in some cases, attempt to address 
specific problems directly related to an offender’s past crime. For 
example, job training or the opportunity to earn a GED (high 
school diploma equivalent) may make it more likely an offender 
will get a job upon release, and thus decrease his chance of 
performing illegal acts as a way to earn money. Anger 
management therapy or mindfulness training, on the other hand, 
attempts to directly impact offender’s decision-making processes 
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by teaching him to slow down and more carefully consider the 
consequences of behavior. 
Some scholars have worried about chemical castration as 
punishment because it consists in a court-ordered direct brain 
intervention (Stinneford, 2005). However, there is another direct 
brain intervention already widely accepted as part of a court-based 
rehabilitative program: drug courts often mandate medical 
treatment of addicted drug offenders. A drug court is a specialized 
or problem-solving court that targets criminal offenders who have 
alcohol and other drug addiction and dependency problems. As of 
2013, there were over 2,800 drug courts operating throughout the 
United States (National Institute of Justice, 2010a), and roughly 
half of them offered medication as a part of addiction treatment 
(Matusow et al., 2013). Such treatment is rehabilitative in that it 
reduces the strength of, or eliminates, persistent, intrusive 
psychological states directly related to offender’s crime and likely 
to cause recidivism (e.g., cravings). Although drug treatment 
regimens are rehabilitative, they are also coercive in that if an 
offender refuses treatment he is removed from the program. Often 
an offender has to plead guilty to the charges against him to stay 
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within the drug court system, but the normal penalties for the 
charges are held in abeyance during treatment (Bahr, Masters, & 
Taylor, 2012). If the offender finishes his or her treatment 
successfully, the charges are dropped. If he or she fails to finish 
treatment, the offender is sent to jail or prison to serve their 
sentence (Bahr et al., 2012). 
One example of a medical treatment used by drug courts is 
topiramate, which treats alcohol and cocaine addiction. 
Topiramate is thought to decrease cravings and has been found to 
significantly improve addiction treatment outcomes (Bahr et al., 
2012). Importantly, treatment of offenders handled by drug courts 
is almost always initiated and guided by a medical professional 
(Bahr et al., 2012). Medication is often given in conjunction with 
therapy, which assists the offender in behavior modification to 
avoid triggers for their addiction and seek healthy alternatives 
such as exercise. The best outcomes for drug court programs are 
associated with a multifaceted treatment approach (Bahr et al., 
2012). 
I have shown that it is unlikely chemical castration can be 
justified by the aims of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. 
Chemical Castration as Punishment 
C13.P58 
But the similarities between the overwhelmingly accepted 
administration of medicine to drug offenders to reduce cravings by 
drugs and administration of MPA to reduce overwhelming sexual 
urges in sex offenders indicate that chemical castration might be 
properly seen as rehabilitative treatment. However, as I will show, 
there are many difficulties fitting chemical castration within the 
rehabilitative treatment model. In the end, I argue that chemical 
castration as currently allowed under U.S. statutes cannot be 
considered rehabilitative treatment because of the way in which 
these statutes administer MPA to sex offenders. 
The biggest problem with the chemical castration statutes 
is that there is no consistent matching between psychological 
disorders or symptoms and MPA as treatment for such disorders 
or symptoms. Let’s just assume for the sake of argument that 
MPA acts to lessen sexual urges and urges to act aggressively. 
Let’s also assume, as I previously argued, that sex crimes are 
committed for any number of (often compound) reasons, including 
overwhelming sexual urges; feelings of aggression, hate, 
frustration, and confusion; false beliefs; and plain old selfishness 
or narcissism. Some sex offenders captured by the chemical 
Healing People 
C13.P59 
castration statutes probably have overwhelming sexual urges, but 
many do not. Some sex offenders captured by the statutes 
probably have strong aggressive urges, but many do not. Some sex 
offenders captured by the statutes may have both sorts of urges, 
but many may not have either. Again, even assuming the efficacy 
of MPA in reducing these urges on its own without supplementary 
treatment such as therapy—something I don’t think it is safe to 
assume—the administration of MPA to the group of offenders that 
qualify for chemical castration in Florida, California, and 
Louisiana will treat a psychological disorder or symptom in only 
some (likely small) subset of these offenders. 
This means the state will end up “treating” psychological 
states within offenders that are unrelated to his crime and 
unrelated to concerns that he will recidivate with regard to a 
similar type of crime—and this is worrying for reasons other than 
just MPA’s inefficiency as treatment. Imagine if, once an offender 
was found guilty of a crime, the court was justified in targeting for 
rehabilitation any psychological aspect of the offender that the 
state determined was dangerous. The state could then decide to 
“rehabilitate” any psychological traits correlated with higher rates 
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of recidivism with regard to any type of crime. For example, an 
offender convicted of theft might be coerced into anger 
management, or addiction treatment, or even administration of 
MPA, if the court determined he had psychological symptoms or 
disorders that might lead to future crimes. 
But this would clearly be a violation of the offender’s 
agency (and as I will argue, constitutional rights): state-sanctioned 
punishment is a response to a specific commission of a crime, and 
forward-looking aims of punishment ought to target recidivism via 
mandatory or coercive programming only with regard to the type 
of crime for which the offender was convicted. Imagine the 
alternative: what if a person arrested and convicted of stealing an 
automobile were subjected by the state to a battery of 
psychological tests to determine if he had a likelihood of 
committing other crimes, including sex crimes? What if this 
offender was then forced into mandatory rehabilitative 
programming for these proclivities (unrelated to his crime)? In this 
case a person arrested for theft might be subject to anger 
management therapy or even chemical castration during his time 
under state supervision resulting from his theft conviction. 
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forcing an offender convicted of theft to take such wide-ranging 
psychological tests seems to be a clear invasion of privacy and 
possibly an unconstitutional search.69 The state is not entitled to 
review and assess the entire psychology of an offender just 
because he has committed a crime. Second, tailoring coercive 
punishment to psychological proclivities unrelated to an 
offender’s crime would seem to violate due process.70 The Fifth 
                                                          
69 In the United States, courts can force defendants to undergo a 
mental evaluation, but only in certain circumstances (e.g., cases 
where the defendant has claimed legal insanity or incompetence). 
70 In Washington v. Harper (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the due process clause permits a state to treat an incarcerated 
inmate for a serious mental disorder with antipsychotic medication 
against his will only where he is dangerous to himself or others, 
and the medication prescribed is in his best medical interest. It 
thus seems likely involuntary treatment of criminal proclivities 
unrelated to an incarcerated offender’s crime may violate due 
process. 
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees of due process 
provides that “no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.” In this case, the court 
would seem to deny liberties (very important liberties, in the case 
of chemical castration) via rehabilitative programming in response 
to criminal proclivities without using the judicial process to find 
the offender guilty of a crime related to those proclivities. I would 
argue that there is no clear difference between the state looking for 
and addressing criminal proclivities unrelated to an offender’s 
crime and the state randomly reviewing law-abiding citizens for 
criminal proclivities and then addressing such proclivities. 
In other words, the state has no more right to address the 
possibility that an offender convicted of theft will commit a sex 
offense than they have to address a worry that an as-of-yet law-
abiding citizen will commit a sex crime based upon the presence 
of certain psychological states. The state is not justified in 
coercive rehabilitative treatment in an attempt to reduce 
recidivism with regard to other types of crime than the one for 
which the offender is being punished. 
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This becomes even more clear when one notes that if the 
drug court statutes were written like the chemical castration 
statutes, every offender who committed certain drug crimes or 
committed a repeat drug crime might be mandated by statute to 
undergo medical treatment for addiction, regardless of whether 
they have a drug addiction. Instead, drug courts are designed by 
statute to identify drug-addicted offenders and to mandate 
treatment only for such offenders (Bahr et al., 2012). In general, 
drug offenders whom the court suspects are addicted undergo a 
medical evaluation. If the offender is found to have an addiction 
that led to his drug crime, the court may then offer treatment for 
that addiction, although again, the “offer” is coercive in that 
refusal will usually result the offender serving their sentence. 
Of course, the state may be justified in offering offenders 
volunteer rehabilitative opportunities that may impact many 
aspects of their psychology, and it should: yoga, chess, gardening 
programs, job training in demolition, and bee-keeping are all 
programs offered to offenders housed in the Cook County Jail (the 
county Chicago is located within) as a means to occupy inmates’ 
time in a constructive way, with hopes that they may increase the 
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inmates’ mindfulness and job prospects. But when the state wishes 
to treat an offender via coercive medical treatment such as MPA, 
the treatment must be narrowly tailored to address an aspect of an 
offender’s psychology that was a primary cause of their crime and, 
further, is a cause for extraordinary worries that the offender will 
commit the same type of crime once he is released. Again, this is 
because any coercive rehabilitative punishment must be a 
narrowly targeted response to the crime committed such that it 
constitutes a proportional response to the criminal act that is likely 
to actually reduce the likelihood of recidivism with regard to the 
type of crime committed. 
Assessment of drug court programs indicate that they do 
indeed reduce rates of recidivism (Bahr et al., 2012). This may be 
because they are designed to target rehabilitative treatment more 
carefully at a group of offenders who suffer from a common 
psychological disorder. This targeted psychological disorder, 
addiction, is quite likely to be a primary cause of their crime and 
also a likely cause of recidivism. This may also be due to the 
multifaceted approach to treatment of addicted offenders, where 
offenders are also given drug tests and therapy or because drug-
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addicted offenders are more likely than sex offenders to be willing 
participants in their treatment program. Drug-addicted offenders 
can choose to reject their treatment and go to prison to serve their 
regular sentence, whereas sex offenders subject to MPA orders 
may face a significantly increased sentence, such as life in prison. 
Thus, while chemical castration bears some surface-level 
resemblances to the treatment model of the drug courts, the latter 
succeeds as a rehabilitative treatment (and reduces recidivism) 
because it narrowly targets the psychological states that led to an 
offender’s crime, encourages offender “buy-in” and supports 
medication with other forms of treatment, such as therapy. 
Chemical castration statutes lack any of these features and 
therefore cannot be justified as rehabilitative punishment. 
But readers at this point may be forgiven for thinking I 
have forgotten an important aspect of the Florida and Louisiana 
statutes: the required medical evaluation. Isn’t this part of the 
statute precisely meant to require a psychiatrist to identify a sex 
offender’s primary reasons for committing their sex crime and 
then to use this information to determine eligibility for MPA, in 
the same way a drug court may use medical professionals to 
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determine who is a drug addict? I think it isn’t at all clear that the 
statutes were written to include a medical examination for this 
purpose, and in practice, it seems unclear that courts and court-
ordered psychiatrists understand this to be the aim of medical 
evaluations under the castration statutes. The Florida statute 
(§794.0235(2)(a)), for example, provides that “an order of the 
court sentencing a defendant to medroxyprogesterone acetate 
(MPA) treatment under subsection (1), shall be contingent upon a 
determination by a court-appointed medical expert, that the 
defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatment.” As Spalding 
(1998) notes, there is no stipulation as to who counts as a medical 
expert (any MD? a MD with a certain specialization? a nurse? a 
psychologist?), nor any information on what qualifies an offender 
as an "appropriate candidate" for treatment. Is the medical experts 
just looking to see if the offender could physically tolerate the 
treatment, or is he or she looking for whether the treatment will be 
effective—and if yes, effective in what sense? 
Consider again Phu Tran’s case. Tran was convicted of 
digitally penetrating two clients of the nail salon where he worked. 
The court record doesn’t make it at all clear why he assaulted the 
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women: he could have experienced overwhelming sexual desire 
and acted upon it, or he could have hated the women and wanted 
to violate them due to this hate, or he could have desired the 
women and not really understood his actions were unwanted (or at 
least criminal). Tran’s reasons for breaking the law aren’t really 
relevant to his guilt: if he sexually penetrated the women by force 
or without consent, Tran committed a crime. But Tran’s reasons 
for committing the crime are relevant to whether or not Tran 
should be considered a good candidate for the rehabilitative 
treatment of MPA. If Tran committed the crimes from 
overwhelming sexual urges MPA might be a useful tool for his 
rehabilitation, by diminishing his sexual urges in such way that he 
might be able to make better sexual choices. But if Tran 
committed the sex crimes from an overwhelming hatred for 
women or out of a misguided attempt to secure a date or a sexual 
experience, application of MPA will address a part of Tran’s 
psychology that is irrelevant to his crime and unrelated to his 
likelihood of recidivism. 
Dr. Thomas, the psychiatrist who examined Tran to 
determine eligibility for administration of MPA testified that Tran 
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exhibited signs of having a sexual disorder and that he was likely 
to commit sex crimes again after his release (Franceschina, 2005). 
Remember that Dr. Thomas also testified that Tran might suffer 
from psychopathy, saying “I'm not prepared to say he's a dyed-in-
the-wool psychopath, but he certainly has some of the 
characteristics.” A journalist present reported that Dr. Thomas 
offered evidence of Tran’s psychopathy as relevant to his 
candidacy for MPA. Dr. Thomas indicated that MPA would make 
Tran “similar to a eunuch” by “shutting down his testosterone”—
presumably with the idea that would make him less dangerous—
and in the end, Dr. Thomas recommended Tran be castrated 
permanently (although the court sentenced him to five years of 
MPA). 
Dr. Thomas’ testimony seems to support chemical 
castration of Tran as either a retributive or incapacitative 
punishment, not as rehabilitative treatment. A recommendation for 
permanent administration of MPA indicates she did not think she 
was performing a medical evaluation of Tran to determine if MPA 
might help him tone down overwhelming sexual urges, such that 
he could learn to make better sexual decisions. If Dr. Thomas did 
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think there was any chance that Tran would be rehabilitated by the 
administration of MPA, she probably wouldn’t have 
recommended Tran be made a “eunuch” for life: this sort of 
recommendation does not offer any hope that Tran will be 
reformed by MPA so as to make better sexual choices. A eunuch 
is a male whose external genitals are removed, often before 
puberty, so that secondary male characteristics fail to develop. Dr. 
Thomas’ use of this term indicates that she viewed MPA as a 
means to incapacitate Tran from sexual choices. And although Dr. 
Thomas stated that Tran suffered from a “sexual disorder,” there is 
no indication she testified that Tran suffered from overwhelming 
sexual urges that led to his crime—urges that might be dampened 
with the administration of MPA. 
Dr. Thomas’s testimony regarding Tran’s psychopathic 
characteristics is especially worrying. If Tran assaulted his victims 
due to lack of empathy for his victims or from a desire to violently 
control them, then administration of MPA may have little impact 
on the psychological causes of Tran’s crime. Dampening sexual 
desire will have little to no impact on his psychopathy, and if 
psychopathy or narcissism (which often coexists with 
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psychopathy; Paulhus & Williams, 2002) were the primary cause 
of Tran’s crime, MPA may have little effect on his likelihood of 
recidivism. 
Finally, note that there is no indication that Dr. Thomas 
recommended therapy or any other treatment in conjunction with 
the MPA. Just like medication to reduce cravings for illegal drugs, 
medication to reduce sexual or aggressive urges is most likely to 
have a rehabilitative effect when therapy is utilized in conjunction 
with medication. 
It might be that other medical health professionals 
performing examinations under the Florida and Louisiana’s 
chemical castration statutes ware more attuned to the idea of 
chemical castration as rehabilitative treatment aimed at persistent 
and overwhelming sexual urges. But there is nothing in either 
statute requiring a medical professional to make a finding that 
some disordered aspect of the offender’s psychology will be 
treated with MPA or that the offender may be less likely to 
recidivate due to the treatment. Instead, the statutes leave courts 
and medical professionals free to determine what it means for an 
offender to be a “good candidate” for castration, such that the 
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examiner may look solely for ability to tolerate the medication, or 
worse, feel they are asked to determine whether an offender 
deserves MPA. And because California doesn’t even require a 
medical evaluation before the administration of MPA, there is no 
chance that offenders castrated under the California statute will be 
screened with regard to whether MPA might have a rehabilitative 
effect. 
Further, in Florida and California, an offender may choose 
surgical castration instead of administration of MPA. It seems 
exceedingly unlikely that offenders who choose surgical castration 
ought to be considered “rehabilitated” with regard to sexual 
choices. Due to the permanency and stronger effect of surgical 
castration, it is more likely to achieve the forward-looking end of 
(permanent) incapacitation than rehabilitation, although it is 
unlikely surgical castration would lead to complete incapacitation 
with regard to sex crimes, and in most cases, permanent 
incapacitation will violate the upper limits of retributive 
proportionality. 
To sum up the argument: the state can’t target any aspect 
of offenders’ psychology it doesn’t like for rehabilitation when 
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rehabilitative treatment is mandatory or coerced. To be justified as 
rehabilitative, coercive medical treatment must be narrowly 
tailored to address a primary psychological cause of an offender’s 
crime and address extraordinary worries about recidivism with 
regard to the type of crime for which the offender is being 
punished. This means that the statutes that allow for such coercive 
rehabilitative treatment must clearly articulate a means for 
identifying those offenders who have a psychological problem, 
such as addiction or overwhelming urges, that were a primary 
cause of their crime and that might be rehabilitated via medication 
or other treatment. As such the Florida, California, and Louisiana 
statutes are not written so that they might be justified in mandating 
chemical castration as rehabilitative treatment. The two states that 
require a medical evaluation, Florida and Louisiana, do not make 
clear that these evaluations are meant to determine candidacy for 
rehabilitative treatment, and California does not require a medical 
evaluation and instead applies castration purely based upon 
aspects of the crime, not the criminal offender. Finally, none of 
the three statutes provide for other common aspects of the drug 
court’s rehabilitative programs (that are likely correlated with 
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their efficacy): a component that would allow offenders to “opt 
out,” other treatment options provided in conjunction with medical 
treatment such as therapy, and a lessening of penalties if the 
treatment program is successfully completed. Thus, none of the 
three statutes can be justified by the forward-looking aim of 
rehabilitation. 
Conclusions 
To be a legitimate use of state power, punishment statutes must be 
written so as to achieve one or more of the primary functions of 
punishment. I have argued here that chemical castration of 
criminal offenders does not achieve the punishment aims of 
retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation and that the most likely 
justification of the practice is rehabilitation. However, the Florida, 
California, and Louisiana chemical castration statutes cannot be 
justified as providing rehabilitative treatment because they qualify 
offenders for chemical castration based upon features of their sex 
offense and do not provide a method for parsing out the small 
subset of offenders who possess a psychological symptom or 
disorder that MPA might treat. Further, these statutes fail to put 
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into place other aspects of a treatment program likely to make 
rehabilitative medical treatment more successful, such as therapy. 
I think the previous discussion supports the claim that any 
state-imposed coercive medical treatment of criminal offenders, 
including any direct brain intervention, must meet three criteria. 
First, the state may only target an offender’s psychological states 
for rehabilitative treatment where such states are directly tied to a 
psychological disorder or symptom—there must be a disorder or 
symptom present to justify medical treatment. Second, because 
rehabilitative treatment of offenders is applied as punishment, the 
state may only target psychological states that (a) act as a primary 
cause of the offender’s crime and (b) give rise to extraordinary 
worries that the offender will recidivate with regard to a similar 
type of crime. Third, the state must have some confidence that the 
rehabilitative treatment imposed will be effective in treating the 
offender’s mental disorder or symptom such that the offender will 
be less likely to recidivate with regard to the same type of crime 
for which he is being punished. 
Further, state-enforced medical rehabilitative treatment 
programs are more likely to be effective if they also have a 
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voluntary component and where treatment includes a nonmedical 
component, such as therapy. Drug court rehabilitative treatment 
programs for drug-addicted offenders meet all of these 
requirements: they target cravings for illegal substances, a 
symptom of addiction, where such symptom is a cause of an 
offender’s crime and are also likely to cause him or her to 
recidivate; medical treatment programs for addiction have been 
shown to be effective; and finally, drug court treatment programs, 
including medical treatment, have been shown to be effective in 
lowering rates of recidivism. Chemical castration programs such 
as the ones in Florida, California, and Louisiana meet none of 
these requirements. Thus, the chemical castration statutes in these 
states represent an unjustifiable use of state power. 
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